Аннотация: I wrote for them: 2nd Parma Workshop in Analytic and Scientific Metaphysics (December 15-16, 2025. University of Parma, Italy).
Abstract
This essay examines the impact of Karl Popper"s philosophical methodology on analytic metaphysics, focusing on his falsificationism, demarcation criterion, and critique of essentialism. By integrating Popper"s emphasis on testability and revisability, analytic metaphysics can engage more effectively with empirical and formal sciences. This paper argues that Popper"s approach challenges metaphysicians to adopt a critical, scientifically informed perspective while addressing fundamental questions about reality, thus enriching contemporary metaphysical inquiry.
Keywords: Falsificationism, Analytic Metaphysics, Demarcation of Science, Essentialism, Naturalistic Metaphysics, Critical Rationalism, Metaphysical Research Programs
Introduction
Analytic metaphysics addresses foundational questions about reality such as the nature of existence, causation, and modality through logical rigor and conceptual clarity. Increasingly, it intersects with empirical and formal sciences, creating a dynamic interplay between philosophy and scientific inquiry. Karl Popper, a pivotal figure in 20th-century philosophy of science, profoundly shaped this dialogue through his work on falsificationism and the demarcation of science from non-science. This essay explores Popper"s influence on analytic metaphysics, highlighting how his methodological insights inform metaphysical investigations and meta-metaphysical debates.
Popper"s Philosophical Methodology
Karl Popper"s (1902-1994) philosophy centers on falsificationism, a criterion for distinguishing scientific theories from non-scientific ones. He argued that a theory is scientific if it can be empirically tested and potentially falsified (Popper 1959: 40). This rejected the positivist reliance on verification, emphasizing the provisional nature of knowledge. Popper"s approach extended to metaphysics, critiquing systems that claimed absolute certainty, such as essentialist definitions of natural kinds (Popper 1945: 217).
In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper proposed that science advances through bold conjectures subjected to rigorous refutation (Popper 1959: 278). By rejecting induction as a means to establish truth, he challenged traditional metaphysical approaches that sought definitive ontological claims. Instead, Popper advocated for critical, open-ended inquiry, which aligns with the evolving methodologies of analytic metaphysics.
Popper"s Influence on Analytic Metaphysics
Analytic metaphysics often tackles questions that seem untestable, such as the nature of universals or possible worlds. Popper"s falsificationism provides a framework for evaluating such claims by encouraging indirect connections to empirical or formal sciences. For example, discussions of causation can draw on insights from physics or probability theory, ensuring metaphysical theories remain empirically relevant (Popper 1959: 193).
Popper"s critique of essentialism significantly impacts metaphysical debates about natural kinds and ontology. He argued that seeking fixed essences or ultimate definitions is misguided, advocating a nominalist view where concepts serve as tools for understanding rather than mirrors of immutable truths (Popper, 1945: 206). This perspective resonates with contemporary metaphysicians like Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000), who questioned rigid ontological categories, and David Kellogg Lewis (1941-2001), who explored flexible frameworks for modality (Quine 1969: 114 & Lewis, 1983: 10).
Popper"s meta-philosophical emphasis on criticism also informs meta-metaphysical debates about the legitimacy of metaphysical inquiry. His insistence on revisability challenges metaphysicians to justify their methods and avoid dogmatism (Popper 1982: 136).
Interplay with Scientific Metaphysics
Popper"s concept of "metaphysical research programs" underscores the heuristic role of metaphysical theories in guiding scientific inquiry, even if they are not directly testable (Popper 1982: 161). For instance, metaphysical assumptions about the uniformity of nature underpin scientific laws but remain open to revision. This view encourages metaphysicians to engage with empirical sciences, as seen in contemporary work on the metaphysics of quantum mechanics or spacetime ontology.
Popper"s influence is evident in naturalistic metaphysical approaches, such as those of Don Ross (b. 1962) and James Ladyman (b. 1969), who argue that metaphysical claims should be constrained by scientific knowledge (Ladyman & Ross 2007: 29). By adopting Popper"s critical methodology, analytic metaphysicians can avoid speculative excesses while contributing to interdisciplinary research, fostering a scientifically informed metaphysics.
Challenges and Critiques
Popper"s framework, while influential, poses challenges for analytic metaphysics. His strict demarcation criterion may dismiss metaphysical questions that resist empirical testing, such as those about consciousness or abstract objects (Feyerabend 1975: 56). Critics argue that this approach limits the scope of philosophical inquiry, as metaphysics often explores concepts beyond falsification. Additionally, Popper"s nominalism may conflict with realist tendencies in analytic metaphysics, such as those defending universals or modal realism (Lewis 1983: 20).
These challenges highlight a productive tension, as Popper"s ideas prompt metaphysicians to clarify their methods and assumptions. By engaging with his critiques, analytic metaphysics becomes a more self-critical and robust discipline.
Conclusion
Karl Popper"s philosophical methodology represents not merely a shift in epistemology, but a transformative reorientation of metaphysics itself. His falsificationism, critique of essentialism, and insistence on critical inquiry have not only influenced analytic philosophy but have also restructured the very conditions under which metaphysical claims can be considered meaningful.
Popper"s rejection of verificationism in favor of falsificationism was not an abstract theoretical maneuver but a response to the concrete failures of dogmatic systems whether in science, politics, or philosophy. His demarcation criterion, which distinguishes scientific propositions from metaphysical or pseudoscientific ones, imposes a material constraint on speculative metaphysics: a theory must, in principle, be capable of interacting with empirical reality to be taken seriously. This does not render metaphysics obsolete but rather repositions it as a heuristic scaffolding for scientific inquiry.
The dialectical consequence is clear: metaphysical systems must now account for their own revisability. Just as scientific theories are fallible and subject to revision, so too must metaphysical frameworks remain open to critique and modification. This aligns with the broader 20th-century shift toward anti-foundationalism in philosophy.
The future of metaphysics, shaped by Popper"s influence, lies in its ability to navigate this dialectic: to be both scientifically grounded and philosophically ambitious, both critical and constructive. In this way, Popper"s thought ensures that metaphysics remains not a relic of dogmatism but a living, evolving inquiry into the fundamental structures of reality.