Henry de Overwood
A confiscatory monetary reform of 1947: prerequisites and results (an essay on the political economy of socialism - as a hypothesis)

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    MMMDCLXXII. A confiscatory monetary reform of 1947: prerequisites and results (an essay on the political economy of socialism - as a hypothesis). - June 25, 2025.

  A confiscatory monetary reform of 1947: prerequisites and results (an essay on the political economy of socialism - as a hypothesis).
  
  
  In 1947, a monetary reform was carried out (in the USSR), which in many information sources is called a "confiscatory" one ("Monetary reform in the Soviet Union, 1947").
  
  The reform of 1947 was a very complex, well-thought-out and skillfully carried action. As a rule, information sources describe its details: what exactly, how, in what order it was carried out, and so on.
  
  But an equally interesting question is the topic: "Why was the reform of 1947 carried out; what are its motives?".
  
  The simplest explanation: this reform was carried out to reduce the money supply, to bring the commodity supply and the money supply "in line".
  
  However, such an explanation entails another question: why was it necessary to carry out the monetary reform of 1947, if a simple change in the prices system would have brought the money supply and the commodity supply "in line"?
  
  The bits of information that remained in the people's memory after the 1947 reform testify to the panic among the population.
  
  Eyewitnesses said (using Rostov-on-Don as an example) that rumors about this reform had spread several days before the start of this action. Many city residents simply did not know what to do and they tried with all their might to invest the Soviet rubles they had: they made a random, sometimes senseless, purchases, - they tried to "convert money into goods".
  
  Thus, the monetary reform of 1947 required not only a significant efforts from the side of the state, but also created a negative social background.
  
  (In general, it can be assumed that the manipulations of monetary units by the Soviet government - ... 1947 - 1961 - "Pavlovian monetary reform" 1991 ... - were one of the reasons for the almost unanimous approval of the Declarations of Sovereignty). (The introduction of "checks"-"certificates" for payments in the Berezka stores system and for similar purposes is "local" ("mini") monetary reforms -?).
  
  So, there is a separate interesting question about the reasons, about the motives of the monetary reform of 1947: why was it not appropriate to gradually bring the money and commodity masses into line by changing the prices system?
  
  The Soviet power existed for about 70 years. During this entire period, the population of the USSR heard stories about the wonderful future that awaited everyone.
  
  Huge volumes of low-paid (almost un-paid), but well-organized, labor were "confirmations" of the successful movement towards a happy future:
  
  Firstly, every year, every five years, the population was informed about economic achievements, which encouraged the population, which inspired a confidence in moving along the right path,
  
  Secondly, at some point, the results of labor (low-paid, almost un-paid, but well-organized) should have become so numerous - the onset of an era of "abundance" was expected - that the principle of "from each - according to his (working) abilities, to each - according to his needs" would be realized.
  
  But it is not so easy to achieve a long (prolonged, lasting) receipt of a huge volumes of the labor, of a work (low-paid, almost un-paid).
  
  There were various factors at work (in usage), for example:
  
  A coercion,
  
  An interest (financial) - that is, the exploitation of a desire to obtain a high personal income,
  
  An ideological influence, convictions, moods.
  
  The reform of 1947 was intended to increase the effectiveness of such factor as "interest".
  
  After the period of military actions in 1941-1945, certain strata of the population accumulated significant funds (financial resources).
  
  Let's name these strata (in general, without additional segmentation):
  
  - military personnel (regular cash payments, one-time cash payments, trophies, etc.),
  
  - people involved in the production of weapons (from the military-industrial complex),
  
  - people who had the opportunity to sell scarce food (mainly those who were connected with a sphere of agriculture).
  
  Perhaps this list can be supplemented.
  
  Naturally, strata with significant financial funds (named and not named here) were little susceptible to such a motive as "financial interest" when authorities were encouraging the population to work almost free of charge.
  
  Of course, the ideological machine was at work (in usage), many people were impressed by the events they had seen, and for (under the influence of) the motive of patriotism (without financial motivation) they could voluntarily leave, having received a diploma with honors from the Polytechnic Institute, from Rostov-on-Don not for Riga or for Moscow, but for (to) a distant mine in a desert area (covered with poisonous dust) and for several years engage in low-paid, heavy, dangerous, highly skilled labor, living in a room of a workers' dormitory.
  
  But no possibility can be overlooked, and it's not appropriate to rely only on an ideological (propaganda) machine, on moods, - or on a factor of compulsion (of coercion).
  
  So, it was considered expedient to carry out the monetary reform of 1947.
  
  The concept of the "long ruble" became widely known. It had a neutral-negative connotation. It was impossible to criticize the "long ruble" too harshly - it was part of state policy. But the right ("best") people had to work not for the "long ruble", but for the right convictions - for the desire for a wonderful future.
  
  As a result of 70 years of history in European Russia, in Siberia, in the Far East, the results of a huge volume of low-paid (almost un-paid), but well-organized, labor (work) were accumulated.
  
  Some of these results it was possible to privatize in a relatively simple, easy and quick way (a "large" privatization).
  
  The other part represented objects of common use. This part was not subject to "large" privatization, but was of interest from the point of view of migration flows (a resident of a country with a not very high level of development, but having a modern Constitution and a modern political system that protects this resident from the simplest schemes of coercion to huge volumes of almost un-paid labor, goes online and gets acquainted with modern standards of life and of consumption. This person is no worse than others, he - in principle - has equal rights and opportunities. He has no inclination to personally carry out huge volumes of almost un-paid labor. There are no opportunities for a well-organized, skilled labor (work). Accordingly, migration trends appear - since there are social spaces in which huge masses of the population were performing (earlier, in past) a huge volumes of almost un-paid labor for a long time - in any case, many infrastructure facilities and other difficult to privatize objects remained for public use). In addition to objects accessible for the "large" privatization (comparatively simple and quick), and "objects of common use", there are also small things left: for example, garden plots, dachas (summer cottages), individual (private) houses, apartments, garages, etc.
  
  Other, more subtle, methods are applied to such ("small") objects, - with the development of a system of charitable houses, into which former owners of houses and apartments can move - after they lose their real estate objects.
  
  Many socio-economic processes speak of the effectiveness of the 1947 reform - as a way to increase the effectiveness of the factor of financial interest in providing of (with) huge volumes of low-paid (almost un-paid), but well-organized, labor (work).
  
  June 25, 2025 10:00
  
  Translation from Russian into English: June 26, 2025 06:28
  Владимир Владимирович Залесский "Конфискационная денежная реформа 1947 года: предпосылки и результаты (очерк политической экономии социализма - в порядке гипотезы).".
  
  
  {3701. Конфискационная денежная реформа 1947 года: предпосылки и результаты (очерк политической экономии социализма - в порядке гипотезы). - 25 июня 2025 г.
  MMMDCLXXII. A confiscatory monetary reform of 1947: prerequisites and results (an essay on the political economy of socialism - as a hypothesis). - June 25, 2025.
  
  Vladimir Zalessky Internet-bibliotheca. Интернет-библиотека Владимира Залесского}

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