Аннотация: Heavy mortars and railway. Sevastopol (1854-1855) - Port Arthur (1904-1905) - Stalingrad (1942 -1943). Historical essay.
Heavy mortars and railway. Sevastopol (1854-1855) - Port Arthur (1904-1905) - Stalingrad (1942 -1943). Historical essay.
In the book of Eugene Tarle "Crimean War" there are concise references to mortars.
'... On March 12 (24), 1854, Napoleon III signed a decree ordering the formation of a special eastern army, the commander of which was appointed Marshal Saint-Arnaud ... In general, about 40,000 people were in the army at the beginning of hostilities.
In addition, a siege park of 24 cannons, 12 howitzers and 22 mortars was formed.
Seven companies were assigned to service the siege park. Boarding began on March 24 (April 5), 1854.
... The English had a siege park of 65 guns (50 guns and 15 mortars) at the time of arrival in Varna.
... The Prussian historian of the siege of Sevastopol, captain Weigelt found out that since November 12 Art., that is, exactly a week after Inkerman, the British batteries were supposed to "limit the fire", and from November 20 almost completely stop it. From November 24, "the artillery was completely silent: there were no more shells!
... This happened as a result of "endless efforts" to deliver ammunition from Balaclava to the English camps at Kilen-beam and Sapun-mount. To transport one medium-sized cannon, 24 horses and a day of work were required; for the transport of large mortars - 30-40 horses and day work. During the day, no more than 90-100 13-inch bombs were delivered from Balaklava in winter.
The French were doing better. And the road was not so long from the Kamiesch [Kamiesch bay], where their material base was, to the camp and siege points, and they quickly adapted the Turkish army to carry heavy loads. Of course, it was impossible to transport guns on Turks, but the Turks carried shells.
... And yet the situation of the defenders of Sevastopol seemed critical. The indirect fire of more than 150 large mortars, which were part of the siege artillery, was supposed to produce terrible destruction on the fortifications, and in the rear behind the bastions, and in the city.
... 1,200 cannons were operating from the Russian side. And 300 large mortars and 800 other guns from the enemy's side. But the Russians didn't have even one hundred mortars, the explosive shells were smaller than the enemy's, the gunpowder reserves were very small, and by the end of these three odd weeks it was ordered to use the shells sparingly. '
So, in the book by Eugene Tarle, the number of mortars (on the side of the allies) increases from 37 to 150. Then the number of mortars reaches 300, after which the allies capture the Malakhov Kurgan and the war actually ends.
'In total, by the 4th (16th) August [1855] the siege batteries [of the Allies], not counting the mobile batteries, were armed with 700 guns ... In addition, the Allies had up to 250 guns in reserve and they expected, in a short time, to receive of 400 large mortars.
(...)
Consequently, for the artillery battle, the attacker had an advantage by 52 guns. On his side was a huge superiority in the in fire of mortars, namely 205 mortars against 69 defenders ...
... but the enemy had five times as much mortar and could operate using a plunging fire [is a form of indirect fire, - a shell attacks target from above; an artillery fire on the hinged trajectory] with a fire, more strong at ten times.
The siege batteries [of the Allies] were equipped with 350-450 ready-made charges, which without difficulty were restocked from the enemy's considerable reserves. ' (Bogdanovich M.I. The Eastern War of 1853 - 1856. St. Petersburg, 1877) [in Russian]
A brief mention by Eugene Tarle of the difficulties in delivering artillery and shells is supplemented by an indirect 'inverted' mention of the railway (on the Allied side).
Eugene Tarle quotes one of the letters: 'They said that they have a railway from Balaklava to Sevastopol, this is nonsense.'
In the book by Eugene Tarle, this 'affirmation through denial', seems, is the only mention of the railway created on the side of the allies.
However, given the complexity of the delivery of ammunition for artillery, there is a certain expediency in creating a railway.
Alexander William Kinglake:
'The problem of ' making a road ' between camp and port long continued to resist all solution, and this, as we saw, because labour in the requisite quantity could neither be got by hiring it, nor wrung from an overtasked army, which - engaged day and night with the enemy, and already doing three times the work that could well be called moderate - was unable to furnish ' hands ' for the execution of any such task...
The idea of constructing this railway had been long ago seized and propelled by the Duke of Newcastle with admirable vigour...' (Alexander William Kinglake 'The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan'. Vol. 7)
'... Under the directions of Lieutenant Stopford of the English the Royal Engineers, our people in the beginning of December constructed an electric field -telegraph and it was towards the close of the same month that a civil engineer (Mr Campbell) began his operations for making the railway between Balaclava and camp... During all the latter part of the period embraced by this chapter, the Allies had been not only busied in arming their batteries with more and heavier guns, but also - and with good help at last from the railway our people had made - in bringing up to their heights such huge loads of ordnance ammunition, and other artillery stores as might serve for a great cannonade.
The bulk of the allied armies had looked forward for weeks and for weeks to the thus prepared effort ... ; but some light newly thrown on the transactions of 1855 has enabled me, if so one may speak, to avert disappointment, and warn enquirers beforehand that, when seeing ... General Canrobert engaged in the promised bombardment, they will see in him - not a real Chief, but rather - a fettered lieutenant without the freedom of action, without the ulterior purpose which alone could give mighty significance to his use of the French breaching guns...' (Alexander William Kinglake 'The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, and an Account of its Progress down to the Death of Lord Raglan'. Vol. 8)
In the book by Christopher Hibbert we see the information about the railway.
'Numerous workers from Croatia, Albania, Greece, Montenegro, Afghanistan, more like bandits, with knives and daggers, laid the railway from Balaklava up to the camp. Laying the sleepers and rails, they shouted and quarreled in their many incomprehensible languages. The necessary materials arrived in early February, and at the end of March [1855] the railway was already operating. The sound of wagon wheels on rails caused a feeling of comfort and nostalgia. Sometimes railway cars were pulled with horses; sometimes a team of 70 sailors connected to each other by an artillery harness. Passengers cheered them up with shouts and jokes; in response, they often grumbled that "one who does not shut up can get out of the car and continue way on foot." (Hibbert, Christopher. The Destruction of Lord Raglan: A tragedy of the Crimean War 1854-55). [the reverse translation from Russian]
So, everything falls into place. For 300 mortars (according to Eugene Tarle; the figure is apparently estimated, approximate), shells are needed, and a railway is needed to deliver shells in large quantities.
Heavy mortars plus shells plus the railway (plus the general Pélissier) ... Efforts are moving towards the result ...
The railway began to be built in December 1854 - February 1855. They completed construction at the end of March. By a strange coincidence, Nikolai Pavlovich died on February 18 (March 2), 1855.
The railway is not a poems by Pushkin or Lermontov. The pasquilles and duels couldn't help ...
Negative emotions are very strong ...
C. Hibbert also mentions mortars, but he seems to be not reporting anything about their number (more precisely, the dynamics of their number). "A Mortar. In mortars more often than in cannons, shells were used. Compared to modern mortars, mortars had a much larger caliber, up to 13 inches [about 330 cm], and resembled huge pots mounted on a special platform. ' (Hibbert, Christopher. The Destruction of Lord Raglan: A tragedy of the Crimean War 1854-55). [the reverse translation from Russian].
Where were the mortars produced, from where they were delivering? Seems, there is no answer to this question in the books by Tarle and Hibbert. (Except for the starting mentions of Eugene Tarle about the presence of 22 mortars at the French and 15 at the British at the beginning of the campaign).
Some additional information comes during familiarizing with the details of the siege of Port Arthur in 1904-1905.
The Japanese troops in the siege used large-caliber 11-inch (280 mm) howitzers (with 500-pound (220 kg) armor-piercing shells) of their own, Japanese manufacture (howitzers were manufactured using technology [license] of the British company Armstrong and with the help of Italian engineers). There is information about the presence in the Japanese army of 18 of 11 inch howitzers (mortars) and 450 other guns.
These large-caliber siege howitzers in a number of sources are called mortars.
The Japanese army delivered artillery cargo to the place of deployment of the guns along an eight-mile (13 km) narrow-gauge railway laid especially for this purpose.
Chronologically, after the surrender of Port Arthur were the Bloody Sunday in St. Petersburg, the October Manifesto (1905) and all subsequent events.
Military history continued to undergo.
As described by the Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasily Chuikov in the book 'The Battle of the Century', the battle for Stalingrad, 'a front-line artillery group was created on the left bank, which was divided into four subgroups: the northern, consisting of 86 guns and mortars, to support the 62nd Army; the southern - consisting of 64 guns and mortars, to support the 64th army; the subgroup of the Volga military flotilla consisting of 16 guns, as a maneuver group along the Volga, and the group of anti-aircraft artillery ....
The decision to leave divisional artillery on the left bank played a positive role in the course of defensive and offensive battles in the city.
Leaving cannon and howitzer regiments beyond the Volga, each commander of a division or brigade could always summon his artillery fire to any section of the front. And the commander of the artillery of the army, Major General N. M. Pozharsky, at the right time could concentrate the fire of batteries of all brigades and divisions (the artillery located behind the Volga) into one point. "
As the chief marshal of the artillery Nikolay Voronov writes in his book "At military service", "The characteristic whistle of heavy shells was heard from time to time. The famous Zavolzhsky artillery group [the artillery located behind the Volga] hit the enemy. Artillery of great and special power was timely withdrawn beyond the Volga. Of course, this group interested me in detail ...
A decision arose to form a separate heavy artillery division from the Zavolzhsky artillery group, which was armed with guns with a caliber of 203 - 280 millimeters. Then all this power will be easier to put together in one fist. A. I. Eremenko was informed of this, the plan was reported to the Stavka, and from there we received consent.
Thus, the first heavy artillery division appeared in the troops of the Stalingrad Front. '
('He [the Supreme Commander-in-Chief ] was thinking. - Listen, what if we call these divizions as regiments?
I began to object, what is a regiment of sixteen cannons?
- No, no, you think about the usefulness of this proposal. What does a a divizion [an equivalent of battalion] mean? In our understanding, this is a small unit. The divizion commander will be subordinate to some small combined-arms chief, no one will reckon with him, and as a result, artillery will be used incorrectly. Let's call the new units as regiments. The commander of the artillery regiment - it sounds! With him, not only the division commander, you look, and the corps commander will be consulting, will take into account the opinion! Few cannons in the regiment? What can you do. Now it happens that there are fewer people in a division than in a normal regiment. But the division commander still remains the division commander. So let we make an artillery regiments. After that, we will increase the number of artillery batteries in them, as soon as our industry supplies us better. ')
The transportation to location of the artillery group on the left bank of the Volga was partly by railway passing through the Volga steppes (at the left bank). Partly by automobile transport.
Yes ... You can recall the words of C. Hibbert: "... the Russian fortifications resembled a" huge boiling volcano "; bayonet fighting was in the suburbs, on the streets and inside buildings ... "
'Boiling volcano' - 'boiling cauldron' - "The Stalingrad Cauldron" ('The Stalingrad boiler'). The result of the battle for Stalingrad was different from the results of 1844-1855 and 1904-1905 ... But there is some similarity of events ...
The law of conservation (of saving) of military history: 'A military history does not appear from nowhere and does not disappear to nowhere. She just goes from one state to another.'
It is curious that in the events of 1844-1855, and in the battle of 1942-1943, battles for Kurgans took place. The names of the Kurgans are also consonant - "Malakhov Kurgan" and "Mamayev Kurgan".
October 6, 2019 11:32
Translation from Russian into English: October 7, 2019 03:54.
Владимир Владимирович Залесский 'Тяжёлые мортиры и железная дорога. Севастополь (1854-1855) - Порт-Артур (1904-1905) - Сталинград (1942 -1943). Исторический очерк'.