Аннотация: The paper was written for participation in Imagination in the History of Philosophy. Institute of Philosophy, HUN-REN Research Centre for The Humanities (9-11 October, 2025. Budapest, Hungary).
Abstract
This essay explores the concept of phantasia (imagination or mental representation) in ancient Greek philosophy, tracing its role in cognitive and psychological processes. Through the perspectives of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics (via Chrysippus), it examines how phantasia facilitates sense-perception, memory, and motivation, bridging sensory experience and rational thought. The analysis highlights the evolution of phantasia as a pivotal concept in understanding human cognition and its motivational implications in moral psychology. By comparing these thinkers, the essay underscores the dynamic interplay between perception, imagination, and action in ancient philosophy.
Keywords: phantasia, imagination, mental representation, ancient Greek philosophy, cognition, moral psychology, motivation.
Introduction
The concept of phantasia (φαντασίαι) in ancient Greek philosophy, often translated as "imagination" or "mental representation," serves as a cornerstone for understanding cognitive and psychological processes. Far from a mere faculty of fantasy, phantasia encompasses the ability to form mental images, mediate sensory data, and influence motivation. This essay investigates phantasia through the works of four key figures: Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics (via Chrysippus) - to elucidate its role in cognition and moral psychology, addressing its significance in sense-perception, memory, and motivational content.
Plato: Phantasia as a Cognitive Mediator
Plato"s treatment of phantasia is nuanced, often intertwined with his epistemology and ontology. In the Sophist, he describes phantasia as a blend of perception (aisthesis) and judgment (doxa), suggesting it arises when sensory impressions are interpreted by the soul (Plato 1997: 264a). For Plato, phantasia is not merely reproductive but involves an active synthesis of sensory data and rational assessment. This is evident in his discussion of visual illusions, such as the bent stick in water, where phantasia mediates between misleading sensory input and rational correction (Plato 1997: 236c). In moral psychology, phantasia plays a role in the soul"s appetitive part, where images of pleasure or pain can spur action, as seen in the Republic"s tripartite soul, where desires are shaped by imagined outcomes (Plato 1997: 439d).
Aristotle: Phantasia as a Faculty of the Soul
Aristotle provides a more systematic account of phantasia in De Anima, defining it as a faculty distinct from perception and thought, yet essential to both (Aristotle 1984: 428a1-2). He describes phantasia as the ability to produce and retain mental images derived from sensory experience, which can persist after the object is gone, as in memory or dreaming (Aristotle 1984: 428b10-15). For Aristotle, phantasia is crucial for all animals, enabling them to respond to environmental stimuli through images that guide movement. In human cognition, it underpins discursive thinking by supplying images for deliberation, as seen in his example of imagining a future action like building a house (Aristotle: 1984 431a15-17). In moral psychology, phantasia is the bearer of motivational content, as desires are often triggered by imagined pleasures or pains (Aristotle 1984: 433b10-12).
Epicurus: Phantasia and Sensory Reliability
Epicurus, in his materialist philosophy, views phantasia as closely tied to sensory impressions. According to Diogenes Laertius, Epicurus uses phantasia to denote the impressions (phantasmata) that strike the soul via the senses, forming the basis of knowledge (Diogenes Laertius 1925: 10.31). These impressions are always true in themselves, as they accurately reflect the atoms emanating from objects, but errors arise in interpretation (Diogenes Laertius, 1925, 10.50). For Epicurus, phantasia is critical in memory and anticipation, where stored impressions allow individuals to recall past pleasures or imagine future ones, driving hedonistic motivation (Long & Sedley 1987: 88). In moral psychology, phantasia shapes desires by presenting images of pleasure, such as imagining a pain-free state, which motivates ethical choices (Long & Sedley 1987: 112).
The Stoics (Chrysippus): Phantasia and Rational Assent
The Stoics, particularly Chrysippus, integrate phantasia into their rationalist framework. For the Stoics, a phantasia is an impression (phantasma) on the soul, akin to a seal on wax, arising from sensory or mental stimuli (Long & Sedley 1987: 239). Chrysippus emphasizes that phantasia requires rational assent (synkatathesis) to become belief or action, distinguishing human cognition from animal reactivity (Long & Sedley 1987:. 241). In moral psychology, phantasia is pivotal, as impressions of good or bad trigger impulses (hormai) toward action, such as pursuing virtue or avoiding harm (Long & Sedley 1987: 420). For example, imagining a virtuous act can motivate a Stoic sage to act consistently with reason. The Stoics" phantasia thus serves as a cognitive and motivational linchpin, mediating between perception and rational action.
Comparative Analysis
Comparing these thinkers reveals phantasia"s evolving role. Plato"s phantasia is a synthetic faculty, blending sensory and rational elements, with implications for moral errors. Aristotle"s is more systematic, serving as a universal faculty for cognition and motivation across species. Epicurus grounds phantasia in materialist epistemology, emphasizing sensory reliability and hedonistic motivation. The Stoics, via Chrysippus, elevate phantasia within a rationalist framework, requiring assent for cognitive and moral outcomes. Together, these perspectives highlight phantasia"s role in bridging sensory experience and rational thought, shaping both cognitive processes and moral actions.
Conclusion
The concept of phantasia in ancient Greek philosophy is a multifaceted faculty that underpins cognition and motivation. From Plato"s synthetic mediator to Aristotle"s universal faculty, Epicurus" sensory impressions, and the Stoics" rational impressions, phantasia evolves as a critical link between perception, imagination, and action. Its role in moral psychology, particularly in motivating behavior through imagined outcomes, underscores its significance in the history of ideas about human cognition. This exploration offers a new perspective on how ancient thinkers conceptualized the interplay of mind, perception, and ethics.
References:
Aristotle. (1984). De Anima. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle (Vol. 1, pp. 641-692). Princeton University Press.
Diogenes Laertius. (1925). Lives of Eminent Philosophers (R. D. Hicks, Trans.). Harvard University Press.
Long, A. A., & Sedley, D. N. (1987). The Hellenistic Philosophers (Vol. 1). Cambridge University Press.
Plato. (1997). Complete Works (J. M. Cooper, Ed.). Hackett Publishing.